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Introduction 
Ever since the formulation of a regional policy toward the former Soviet south 
in the mid 1990s, the Caspian Sea has played a special role in the White 
House's Eurasian policy. The geographical collocation of the basin, right in the 
heart of the Eurasian landmass at a critical crossroads of influence projection 
from the main regional actors, coupled with the presence of relevant and large-
ly unexplored energy resources, were the main features providing the Caspian 
with a relevant place in US strategic thinking and on its foreign policy agenda. 
Over the course of the last twenty years, a wide scholarly and institu-
tional debate has developed around the nature of US interests at play in the 
Caspian area. All the more so, as the notion of a new ‘Great Game’ – taking 
place in the Caspian area and aimed at exploiting and transporting its energy 
resources as a key tool for regional influence – gained consensus among Inter-
national Relations scholars and analysts.1 Although the reference to the nine-
teenth-century Great Game proved misleading, not recognizing the higher 
complexity of post-1991 regional dynamics, it is nonetheless equally true that 
competition for influence has been fierce and the efforts made and role played 
by the United States in the political, institutional and economic regional tran-
sition proved to be decisive.  
That said, although the debate on the nature of US interests in the 
Caspian quite properly concluded that the United States had no vital interest 
                                                            
1 See, for instance, M.E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia, McNair Paper no. 47, Washing-
ton, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996. 
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in the area,2 this consideration does not diminish the importance of Caspian 
politics in the regional power transition, making it a significant subject of 
study in order to understand the dynamics and evolution of the United States’ 
post-Cold War Eurasian policy. 
Moreover, starting from the assumption of the lack of a vital US inter-
est at play in the Caspian area, it is also possible to agree with those who said 
that the United States’ policy toward the region – and hence the basin – has 
been largely a derivative of other objectives3 i.e. that the US never arranged a 
Caspian policy per se. However, the relevance of such objectives, accentuated 
by the strategic location of the basin – the convergence point of different and 
crucial regional security complexes – has made US Caspian policy both a stra-
tegic vector and a key tool for US action in different Eurasian scenarios.  
Against this backdrop, the aim of the article is to highlight patterns of 
continuity and discontinuity in US policy toward the Caspian – i.e. objectives 
pursued and instruments adopted – by analyzing the evolution of both energy 
and security cooperation, which have simultaneously represented the main 
tools and testing grounds of the White House regional policy. 
10.1 Engaging the Caspian: Clinton Administration strategic thinking and 
policies 
Assuming office one year after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence, along with Iran, of four newly independent riparian states, it was 
chiefly the Clinton Administration which took responsibility for laying the 
foundations of the US Caspian policy. 
Despite the fact that the Administration’s choices marked the course of 
the White House regional policy from then on, the latter was rather slow in 
identifying US interests in the basin and, broadly speaking, in the area. This 
attitude apparently contrasted with the greater activism of US private inter-
ests, which reached the Caspian Sea long before the policy makers turned their 
attention to the area. Indeed, although US energy companies were already en-
gaged in the attempt to develop Caspian offshore resources on the eve of the 
                                                            
2 See, for instance, Joseph Nye categorization of US security interests, according to which the Caspian area 
would be considered as a “C” threat – i.e. posing threat to US interest, but not to its immediate security. The 
same view was shared by Administration officers – specifically by John E. Herbst, Deputy Coordinator for the 
New Independent States at the Department of State – portraying US interests in the area as important yet not 
vital. See J. Nye, “Redefining National Interests”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 4, 1999; J. Herbst in: “US Inter-
ests in Caucasus Region”, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representa-
tives, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 30 July 1996, p. 10. 
3 See, F. Starr, “Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian”, The National Interest, no. 47, Spring 1997, pp. 
20-31; J. Barnes, US National Interests in the Caspian Basin: Getting Beyond the Hipe, James A. Baker III 
Institute for Public Policies, April 1998. 
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Soviet collapse,4 the US Administration was not quick to follow and support 
private initiative.  
Various were the motivations behind this initial reluctance to be active-
ly involved in the area, the most relevant being the will not to jeopardize the 
unprecedented entente with the Kremlin which, moreover, came to be regard-
ed as a stabilizing force in the volatile post-Soviet environment, whose 
‘wrenching’ economic and political transitions posed “troubling uncertainties” 
to US strategic planning.5 Such an attitude resulted, on the one hand, in a lais-
sez faire policy toward Russia – which de facto gained an indirect form of 
recognition of a privileged set of interests in what came to be regarded as the 
Russian ‘near abroad’ – and on the other hand, in an indirect ‘proxy’ engage-
ment pursued mainly through Turkey, whose liberal-democratic and secular 
model appeared to be a natural reference and inspirational point to be provid-
ed to the former Soviet republics, and especially to those linked to Turkey 
through ethno-linguistic affinity. Therefore, the very first phase of US policy 
toward the former Soviet Union was marked by a lack of regional or sub-
regional focus, with the sole but relevant exception of disarmament policies, 
which brought specific regional actors – namely Belarus, Ukraine and Ka-
zakhstan – onto the White House foreign policy radar. 
It was only with the gradual decline of the so-called Russia First policy 
that, from late 1994, the White House set up a consistent regional policy to-
ward the former Soviet south. In this scheme, Caspian Sea policy became a key 
vector for advancing US regional and sub-regional interests and goals, mainly 
due to the basin’s resource extraction potential. 
The development of the Caspian Sea energy potential was functional to 
the achievement of three core objectives of Washington’s foreign and energy 
policy. Above all, it represented a key tool with which to support and foster the 
newly independent states’ recently-achieved independence and sovereignty, as 
well as help them overcome the tough economic crisis inherited at the end of the 
Soviet system.6 Indeed, concerns connected to state failure were paramount for 
the US view of the region and, therefore, while the successful transition of the 
newly-emerged and emerging democracies in Europe and the former Soviet Un-
ion was considered to be “vital to world stability”, more specifically the Clinton 
Administration acted from the assumption that “a stable and prosperous Cau-
                                                            
4 The reference goes primarily to the contacts established by the Kremlin, since 1987, with Chevron and BP for 
the development of Kazakh Tengiz field and Azerbaijani Azeri filed. S. LeVine, Il petrolio e la gloria. La corsa al 
dominio e alle ricchezze della regione del Mar Caspio, Fagnano Alto, Il Sirente, 2009, pp. 97ss. 
5 The White House, National Security Strategy, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994, p. 1. 
With specific reference to the Caspian littoral states, US-Russian cooperation was essential in order to engage 
Kazakhstan, which inherited significant part of Soviet weaponry, in negotiations concerning nuclear disarma-
ment and destruction of weapons of mass.  
6 S. Talbot, A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Address at Johns 
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 21 July 1997. 
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casus and Central Asia will help promote stability and security from the Medi-
terranean to China”.7 
Secondly, and consistently with the approach institutionalized by the 
1998 Comprehensive National Energy Strategy,8 the development of Caspian 
energy potential responded to the need to diversify hydrocarbon producing ar-
eas. Under this perspective Caspian resources would have allowed a reduction 
in over-dependence on Middle-Eastern suppliers and, at the same time, to limit 
OPEC’s grip on the oil market.9 
The third and central tenet of the Clinton Administration’s Caspian pol-
icy was “vigorous promotion of US business interests”.10 Indeed, in the Admin-
istration’s view the engagement of national firms in projects aimed at the devel-
opment and export of the basin’s hydrocarbons provided the ‘single best avenue’ 
for enhancing cooperation, as well as a favored tool for fostering regional coop-
eration among the newly-independent states.11 Moreover, besides being func-
tional to the enhancement of bilateral relations, US – and, broadly speaking, 
Western – private initiatives were seen as a way to promote the reform of the na-
tional energy sectors as well as an incentive for producer states to improve busi-
ness practices and the investment climate, thereby fostering the path toward the 
free market and, hence, toward regional prosperity and stability.12 Thus, sup-
porting national companies meant advancing a logic of mutual convenience, al-
lowing US companies to circumvent key constraints to activities in the area, and 
producer countries to attract FDI. 
Against this backdrop, between 1993 and 1997, US firms supported by 
the White House took the lead in the development of the most promising Cas-
pian oil and gas fields, especially in the Kazakh and Azerbaijani offshore sec-
tors of the basin (see Table 1). 
 
 
                                                            
7 See The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, US Government Printing 
Office, 1993, p. 1; Idem, A National Security Strategy for A New Century, Washington, US Government Print-
ing Office, 1997, p. 72. 
8 Department of Energy, Comprehensive National Energy Strategy, Washington, April 1998. 
9 See remarks by D.L. Goldwyn, Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Affairs at the Department of 
Energy, in: “The Status of Infrastructure Projects for Caspian Sea Energy Resources”, Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, US Senate, US Government Printing Office, 2000, p. 7. 
10 J. Herbst, (1996), p. 4. 
11 Ibid. 
12 D. Goldwyn, (2000), p. 6. 
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Table 10.1 - US firms stakes in major Caspian area oil and gas fields (at 
December 1998) 
Field Country Company Stake Year* 
Tengiz Kazakhstan Chevron (Texaco) 
ExxonMobil (Mobil) 
50% 
25% 
1993 
Karachaganak Kazakhstan Chevron 20% 
 
1997 
Azeri-Chirag-
Gunseshli 
Azerbaijan Amoco 
Penzoil 
Unocal 
McDermott 
17.01% 
9.82% 
9.52% 
2.45% 
1994 
Nord Caspian Sea  
(incl. Kashagan) 
Kazakhstan ExxonMobil 
ConocoPhilips 
18.52% 
9.26% 
1997 
Absheron Azerbaijan Chevron 30% 1997 
* year refers to the signing of the PSA and Joint venture establishment for Tengiz 
   Sources: Compiled by the author from various sources. 
Closely related to the aforementioned goals, US Caspian policy pur-
sued other equally important strategic aims, the relevance of which went be-
yond the boundaries of the Caspian area, gaining relevance in a broader re-
gional perspective. The White House energy policy in fact represented a key 
tool for keeping “Turkey in, Iran outside and Russia tied down” in the wider 
Caspian area, to paraphrase Lord Ismay’s famous slogan. 
Starting from the assumption that Ankara's and Washington's interests 
in the region complemented each other and from the need to work together to 
achieve common goals,13 keeping “Turkey in” basically meant actively sup-
porting Ankara’s regional projection and, in particular, its Caspian energy 
strategy – both in terms of Turkish firms’ participation in upstream projects 
and of support for Turkocentric infrastructural projects. This goal had both 
an economic and a strategic rationale. Indeed, while it was functional to the 
enhancement of relations between Ankara and the Turkic states of the wider 
Caspian area, at the same time it aimed to ensure that the growing Turkish 
demand for energy would not result in an increase in dependence – and hence 
vulnerability – on energy imports from Russia and Iran.  
Against this backdrop, diversification of Turkish energy supply chan-
nels was in itself both an aim and a tool for achieving wider regional goals. In 
White House strategic thinking, Turkey had a greater role to play in US re-
gional policy than merely offering an outlet for Caspian hydrocarbons. Tur-
key’s strategic location between the Caspian basin and the European market 
                                                            
13 M. Adair, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, in: “US Interests in the 
Caucasus Region”, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representative, 30 July 
1996, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1996, p. 47. 
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provided a natural bridgehead for infrastructure projects, allowing the basin’s 
newly-independent producers to benefit from an export network able to reach 
Western consumers by simultaneously bypassing existing Russian infrastruc-
tures to the North and potential Iranian routes to the South. Put forward in 
the second half of the 1990s,14 the concept of an East-West energy corridor be-
tween Central Asia and Europe became the centerpiece of US Caspian policy 
and was one of the main reasons behind the support provided, since early 
1995, to the Azerbaijani-Georgian-Turkish route for the export of oil and gas 
extracted in Azerbaijan – seen as the Western leg of the corridor project. In 
this context, the Caspian basin gained “double value” for the US regional en-
ergy policy – not only as a producing area for relevant and largely unexplored 
energy resources but also, potentially, as a key transit channel for Central 
Asian hydrocarbons going westward. 
In the Clinton Administration’s view, the primary justification of the 
East-West Corridor was the need to prevent Caspian exports from being de-
pendent on transit through the territory of existing producer states – which 
could prioritize their own exports rather than those of Caspian producers – as 
well as from being dependent on an already-congested regional choke point 
such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Bosphorus.15 
Besides addressing commercial logic, such a stance was consistent with 
the US broader strategic approach to the former Soviet southern tier. Indeed, 
while circumvention of the Russian network was a way to avoid perpetuating 
forms of economic – and therefore political – dependence on Moscow, the firm 
exclusion of Iran from the Caspian was the result of the long-standing crisis in 
bilateral relations and, simultaneously, the will to avert the expansion of Tehe-
ran’s influence in the post-Soviet space. To simplify this, it may be argued that 
US Caspian policy was pursuant to a ‘double containment’ strategy which, 
however, worked at different degrees of intensity vis-à-vis Iran and Russia.  
Keeping ‘Iran outside’ Caspian development represented an absolute 
imperative for US policy, an isolation strategy which went as far as vetoing 
any participation of Iranian companies in Caspian oil development projects.16 
On the contrary, the Administration’s policy toward Russia was more nu-
                                                            
14 The corridor concept was formalized and became the cornerstone for the 1997 Silk Road Strategy Act, 
whose main aim was “to target assistance to support the economic and political independence of the countries 
of the South Caucasus and Central Asia”. Hon. B. Gilman, The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1997, H.R. 2867, 
Congressional Record, vol. 143, Issue 156, US Government Printing Office, Washington, November 1997, pp. 
E2240-2. 
15 F. Pena, US Secretary of Energy, in: “The Us Role in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, Hearing Before the 
Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 30 April 1998, US GPO, Washington, p. 12. 
16 Besides influencing the decision of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company not to involve Iranian 
companies in the 1994 “Contract of the Century”, US Administration pursued the Teheran isolation policy main-
ly through the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. The Act imposed sanctions on companies investing over $20 
million per year in Iran. As per the evolution of US normative action aimed at Iran isolation, K. Katzman, Iran 
Sanctions, Congressional Research Service Report, 11 October 2013.  
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anced. With the ultimate goal of balancing, and not eradicating, Moscow’s in-
fluence in its neighborhood, and consistent with the desire to keep dialogue 
and cooperation channels open, US policy toward Russia was a delicate bal-
ance of containment and engagement strategies – a “carrot and stick” ap-
proach in which Caspian energy development was one the most visible exam-
ples. Therefore, although on the one hand US Caspian policy was basically 
aimed at breaking the Russian monopsony on the purchase of regional hydro-
carbons – as well as limiting its dominant position on the Turkish market – on 
the other hand the White House constantly sought to avoid giving energy 
competition the connotation of a “zero sum game” between Russian and US 
interests. On the contrary, with the ultimate goal of keeping Moscow “tied 
down” in energy cooperation, it always stressed the win-win nature of Caspian 
development,17 welcoming joint ventures involving respective NOCs and advo-
cating a ‘multiple pipeline’ scheme for the export of Caspian resources, fully 
compliant with the East-West Corridor concept. 
The multiple pipeline logic was adopted on both shores of the Caspian. 
In Azerbaijan, it materialized in the support simultaneously provided for the 
Northern and Western routes – toward the Russian and Georgian Black Sea 
shores respectively – for the export of Early Oil extracted in the Azeri-Chirag-
Guneshli (ACG) offshore field. In Kazakhstan, the US supported the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium pipeline instead, designed to carry oil from the Tengiz 
field to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, running along the north-
ern Caspian shores (see Table 10.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
17 Besides being consistent with the aforementioned logic, the prudent mix of containment and engagement 
policies was the result of the awareness that Moscow lacked a single and coherent vision of the relations with 
the neighbors, torn between neo-imperial tendencies and liberal views. Under this perspective, the engage-
ment strategies were functional in supporting the “dovish” positions within the establishment, favoring a transi-
tion suited to US interests and policies. 
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Table 10.2 - US multiple pipeline scheme for the Caspian oil and gas 
export 
Pipeline Main source US Companies Commissioned 
Baku-Supsa Azeri-Chirag-
Guneshli (ACG) 
Early oil 
Chevron  
ExxonMobil  
Devon Energy  
Hess Corporation  
1999 
Baku-Novorossysk ACG Early oil Chevron  
ExxonMobil  
Devon Energy  
Hess Corporation  
1997 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) ACG Chevron,   
ConocoPhillips 
Hess Corporation 
2005 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium Tengiz 
Karachaganak 
Chevron,  
Arco 
ExxonMobil  
AMOCO  
Orient 
2001 
South Caucasus Pipeline Shah Deniz No US company 2006 
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Turkmenistan ---- ---- 
 
Besides helping overcome the technical and financial issues that ham-
pered the realization of pipeline projects,18 US involvement in the Caspian en-
ergy competition proved to be essential in coordinating governmental and pri-
vate activities, and building a wider consensus and solidarity of intent among 
stakeholders which allowed for the laying of Caspian pipelines. Such consen-
sus was all the more relevant for the realization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline which, though representing the fulfillment of US regional vision 
and primary goals, had a weak economic rationale compared to alternative ex-
port routes due to the high costs of the project and  the low energy prices in the 
world market throughout 1990s.19 Indeed it is difficult to overestimate the rele-
vance of the BTC, which realized the US Administration’s vision and goals in 
terms of development of the basin’s resources, enhancement of cooperation 
                                                            
18 US support for pipeline projects proved to be decisive in involving international and national financial institu-
tion as well as in helping coordinate stakeholders activities. Under the latter perspective, particularly significant 
was the 1998 opening, in Ankara, of the Caspian Finance Center, aimed at coordinating regional activities of 
US export finance agencies. Moreover, a key provision for the realization of the regional goals was the creation 
of the post of Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, 
entrusted sine July 1998 with the task of “assuring maximum coordination within the Executive Branch of US 
policy and programs relating to the development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Basin”. The White 
House Office of the Press Secretary, Morningstar Named Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy, 
Statement by the Press Secretary, 24 July 1998. 
19 As per coeval critic views on BTC economic rationale, see D. Dettke (ed.), A great game no more: oil, gas 
and stability in the Caspian Sea region, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Washington and Berlin, 1999. 
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among regional actors and containment of both Russian and Iranian regional 
influence. In such a context, the October 1998 Ankara Declaration of support 
for the BTC as the main export pipeline project from Azerbaijan – subscribed to 
by the Turkish, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Kazakh and Uzbek presidents – and the 
November 1999 signing of the intergovernmental agreements for the pipeline 
construction were the main diplomatic achievements of Clinton’s Caspian ener-
gy policy. 
Although economic and commercial considerations were paramount 
for US regional projection – at least at first sight – security cooperation was a 
relevant and ineluctable component of US policy toward the Caspian Sea. 
Moreover, investing in security cooperation with Caspian partners – simulta-
neously a key aim and a precious tool in view of regional development and 
stabilization – represented a basic tool for reducing the ‘above ground’ risks 
faced by US and Western investors in the energy sector.20 
However, against the backdrop of the tensions generated by the 
NATO eastward enlargement, the will not to antagonize Russia as well as the 
difficult situation of the Caspian littoral states21 prevented the US from direct-
ly engaging in the area – with the partial exception of the Congress-approved 
foreign military education and training programs and activities.22 Therefore, 
security cooperation was mainly pursued through multilateral means, both di-
rectly and indirectly. 
From the former point of view, although maritime cooperation never 
came to the fore, Caspian states were engaged in the process of transformation 
of the NATO from a defense alliance to a wider security cooperation mecha-
nism projected over the wider Eurasian space. The main tools for engaging 
Caspian littoral states were the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC), launched in 1994 and 1997 respectively. While 
the EAPC involved partners in political dialogue, providing them with a signif-
icant yet indirect form of territorial integrity guarantee, under the PfP scheme 
bilateral programs were initiated in order to reform the military apparatus, 
                                                            
20 As per a coeval perspective on the close link between energy or economic issues and security in the region, 
see S. Blank, Energy and Security in Transcaucasia, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Car-
lisle Barracks, 1994. 
21 Under this perspective, the 1994 Department of Defense Annual Report highlighted that: “Establishment of 
programs with [...] the Caucasus nations awaits a peaceful settlement to their armed conflicts, and cooperation 
with other Central Asian nations has been deferred until they implement political and economic reforms”. US 
Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington: US Government Print-
ing Office, 1994, p. 81. 
22 Under the International Military Education and Training Program, 2.821 thousands dollars were allocated to 
Kazakhstan between 1992 and 2000, while 1.553 thousands dollar were allocated to Turkmenistan between 
1994 and 2000. Moreover, in the same timeframe Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan received 7.050 and 2.150 
thousands dollars under Foreign Military Financing program. Due to the restrictions on assistance to Azerbai-
jan established by the Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, no security cooperation was established be-
tween Department of Defense and Baku. Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Mili-
tary Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales And Other Security Cooperation. Historical Facts”, Financial 
Policy And Analysis Business Operations, DSCA, September 2012, pp. 531-533; 697-699. 
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improve defensive capabilities, foster regional cooperation, build mutual un-
derstanding and promote interoperability of forces. 
Besides developing under the NATO umbrella, security cooperation 
was simultaneously pursued through the promotion of multilateral mecha-
nisms for regional cooperation. The foundation of the GUAM (Organization 
for Democracy and Economic Development) organization was a key initiative 
to support and foster regional cooperation outside Russian-promoted and 
hegemonized frameworks. Established in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbai-
jan and Moldova, the grouping had tight relations with the Clinton Admin-
istration.23 Moreover, though GUAM included only a single littoral state, the 
emphasis placed by the group on the coherent and effective development of the 
Caspian extraction and export potential, as well as the need to protect regional 
infrastructures24, nevertheless provided the forum with a special role in US 
policy toward the basin. Against this backdrop, although systemic and region-
al conditions prevented security cooperation proposals and objectives from ac-
tually being achieved, nonetheless such a vector of GUAM cooperation sig-
naled the priority given to security both in relations among its members and 
between them and Euro-Atlantic partners, as well as in the White House's con-
ception of regional policy. 
10.2 Bush Administration’s ‘security first’ approach toward the Caspian  
The advent of the George W. Bush Administration did not change the main 
drivers of US regional and Caspian policy.25 This was especially true in the en-
ergy policy field, since the crisis experienced by the US in 2000-2001 placed the 
issue high on the electoral and presidential agenda, providing fresh stimulus to 
the fulfillment of the Clinton Administration’s regional goals.  
Hence it was not by chance that one of the first initiatives undertaken 
by the new Administration was the establishment of a National Energy Policy 
Development Group which, under the guidance of Vice President Dick Chen-
ey, was charged with the task of developing a comprehensive long-term strate-
gy to meet US energy requirements – embodied by the May 2001 National En-
ergy Policy.26 
                                                            
23 See T. Japaridze, “The Organization for Democracy and Development-GUAM: A road map to relevance?”, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, no.3-4(51-52), 2008, p. 76. 
24 For instance in 1998 GUAM members discussed about the possibility of establishing a regional peacekeep-
ing force aimed at the protection of the Caspian pipelines to work, possibly, within the framework of the PfP. A. 
Burke, A US Regional Strategy for the Caspian Sea Basin, Naval War College, Newport, 2000, p. 16. 
25 As per the primacy of security and energy, along with internal reform, for the US projection toward the area, 
see A.E. Jones, “Central Asia: Developments and the Administration’s Policy”, Testimony Before the Subcom-
mittee on the Middle East and Central Asia House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 29 Oc-
tober 2003. The same goals were put forward into the March 2006 US National Security Strategy. 
26 National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), National Energy Policy, US Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, 2001. 
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Besides tackling the energy issue from the traditional domestic demand 
perspective, the so-called “Cheney Report” devoted special attention to the 
supply and external components of the energy equation, balancing domestic 
energy interests against international strategic concerns for the first time.27 
Above all, the international scope of the document was the result of the shelv-
ing of the “energy independence” rhetoric, which resulted in greater emphasis 
on the external component of energy security policies and the need to enhance 
the linkage between US international relationships and energy security – there-
fore making the latter a priority of US trade and foreign policy. The document 
maintained, “US national energy security depends on sufficient energy sup-
plies to support US and global economic growth”.28 
In the above scheme, the Caspian Sea was regarded as one of the key 
areas in which the Administration was called to engage in order to strengthen 
trade alliances, deepen dialogue with major oil producers and work for greater 
oil production with a view to ensuring diversification of supply. In particular, 
the Report recommended that the Presidency deepen commercial dialogue 
with Caspian states – and particularly with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan – in 
order to provide a strong, transparent and stable business climate for energy 
and related infrastructure projects. Moreover the Report recommended sup-
porting the efforts of private investors and regional governments to develop 
the BTC oil pipeline and the Shah Deniz gas pipeline – the latter being seen as 
a way “to help Turkey and Georgia diversify their natural gas supplies and 
help Azerbaijan export its gas via a pipeline that will continue diversification 
of secure energy supply routes”.29   
Besides being able to rely on the political and institutional channels set 
up by the previous Presidency, the Bush Administration’s Caspian energy pol-
icy took advantage of the steady rise in oil prices30 which contributed to re-
move one of the main commercial hurdles to the implementation of pipeline 
projects along the Azerbaijani-Turkish route. Therefore, having helped pipe-
line projects receive financial support from the World Bank, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC), the Bush Administration presided over the con-
struction of the BTC and BTE, inaugurated in 2005 and 2006 respectively. 
                                                            
27 For a coeval analysis of the 2001 National Energy Policy, see E. Morse, A. Myers Jaffe, Strategic Energy 
Policy Update, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy and Council on Foreign Relations, 2011. 
28 NEPDG, (2001), pp. 8-13. 
29 Ibid., pp. 8-13. The key role of the Caspian development in strengthening US energy security and the shared 
prosperity of the global economy was embodied in the 2002 National Security Strategy. See The White House, 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 
2002, pp. 19-20. 
30 The price of West Texas Intermediate oil – the U.S. benchmark – fell, in consequence of the Asian crisis, till 
$11.28 in December 1998. Instead, at the start of the BTC construction, in September 2002, the price was 
above $30 – while by the time first Azerbaijani oil reached Ceyhan, in May 2006, the price increased to $70.84. 
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Notwithstanding the high degree of continuity between the Clinton and 
the Bush administrations’ approach toward the Caspian, the main difference 
between them lay in the balance of their major vectors i.e. the prioritization of 
energy and security considerations and policies. While energy policy took pri-
ority over security cooperation during the Clinton presidential mandates, the 
Bush Administration marked the reversal of these priorities.   
Clearly, the 9/11 attack on the US represented the single element trig-
gering such a change in policy priorities – a change whose nature was tactical 
rather than strategic, basically accounting for an acceleration of policies initi-
ated in the course of the previous decade. Above all, 9/11 had a direct and 
deep impact on the domestic premises of US Caspian policy, greatly influenc-
ing the public opinion’s conception of the area. While before 9/11, it appeared 
difficult for the US Administration to pursue a more direct engagement to-
ward an area perceived as remote and far from the national interest, after the 
terrorist attacks a broad consensus emerged on the need for a more proactive 
policy. Moreover, at a systemic and regional level, the anti-terrorist campaign 
launched after 9/11 generated an important convergence in transatlantic poli-
cies as well as a relevant yet short-lived ‘honeymoon’ between Washington and 
Moscow, which lent support to the US in the Central Asian Enduring Free-
dom campaign.31 Both trends facilitated a proactive US policy toward the 
Caspian basin and, broadly speaking, toward the Caucasus and Central Asian 
regions. 
While continuing to lend support to the multilateral regional and sub-
regional security cooperation frameworks,32 the Bush Administration’s Caspi-
an policies were characterized by a greater emphasis on the bilateral level of 
relations with partners. In such a context, the main accomplishment which 
made it possible for the White House to pursue a more coherent Caspian poli-
cy was the possibility – granted to the Administration by Congress – to waive 
on an annual basis section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which pre-
                                                            
31 In the wake of 9/11 events, the emerging of high expectations raised by Washington-Moscow entente the 
consequent possibility of building a “truly cooperative security regime across the former Soviet Union” are best 
portrayed by the vision of even US traditionally hard-liners. See e.g. S. Blank, The Future of Transcaspian se-
curity, Policy Papers, US Army War College, 2002. 
32 The reference goes particularly to NATO and GUAM. While the US supported the re-launching of GUAM 
framework under the denomination of GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, NATO 
regional focus deepened considerably in the wake of September 11 and as a result of the decisions taken at 
Prague and Istanbul summits in 2002 and 2004. At Prague Summit Allies agreed to deepen bilateral coopera-
tion through the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), a tailored mechanism designed to ensure that the 
various mechanisms in use correspond to partners’ priorities. Along with Georgia (2004), Armenia (2005) and 
Moldova (2006), Azerbaijan agreed the first IPAP with NATO in May 2005, while Kazakhstan in January 2006. 
Moreover, in Prague the North Atlantic Council launched the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-
T), aiming at  improving bilateral cooperation in the fight against terrorism, through political consultation as well 
as practical measures. Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan participate in the PAP-T framework. The Istanbul 
Summit marked the further deepening of NATO’s focus on the wider Caspian area, as primarily testified by the 
decision to create the post of Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia 
along with two NATO Liaison Officers, based in Georgia and Uzbekistan. 
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vented direct military assistance to Azerbaijan. The circumvention of this legis-
lation, unsuccessfully but constantly pursued also by the previous Administra-
tion, was indeed facilitated by the aforementioned national consensus on the 
need for a proactive regional policy on the one hand, and the prompt support 
that Baku ensured for the Enduring Freedom operation on the other. Azerbai-
jani support – along with Kazakh and Turkmen support – proved to be criti-
cally important for the success of military operations in Afghanistan, as well as 
being fully in line with the guidelines for action outlined by the National Secu-
rity Strategy released in September 2002.33 As a key transit area for reaching 
the Afghan scenario, the littoral states’ granting of overflight, landing and re-
fueling rights in support of operations in Afghanistan, along with the availa-
bility of their port and road networks for sea and land transportation of non-
lethal equipment, made the Caspian a vital corridor for US and NATO re-
gional power projection within the so-called Northern Distribution Network 
(NDN).34 In addition, the burden-sharing problem of the NATO-led Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) participants, as well as the disagree-
ment regarding the mission’s scope and threat perception, made the contribu-
tion of regional non-NATO partners all the more important to the US.35  
Therefore, as of 2002 the United States launched bilateral military co-
operation with Azerbaijan and intensified its existing ties with Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, providing the littoral states with a considerable amount of mili-
tary aid, mainly under the Foreign Military Financing, Counterterrorism Fel-
lowship Program and the International Military Education and Training pro-
grams (see Table 10.3). Against this backdrop, US military assistance acquired 
a significant maritime dimension, designated to improve the partners’ ability 
to prevent and respond to terrorism, nuclear proliferation and other transna-
tional threats in the Caspian, such as drug and human trafficking. These, in 
particular, were the basic aims of the Caspian Guard Initiative, launched in 
2005 to coordinate activities in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with those of the 
                                                            
33 In particular, basing, refuelling and overflight rights proved to be critically important in order to create a web 
of small forward operation bases – the so called lily pads – ensuring US military strategy an higher degree of 
flexibility. See V. Korkmaz, “The New Power Calculations and ‘Structured’ Relations in the Fluctuating Security 
Environment of Eurasia”, in N. Atesoglu Guney (ed.), Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey, 
Ashgate, Albershot, 2007, pp. 99-119. 
34 The NDN is composed of three main land routes. Among these, the Southern Route connects Georgian 
Black Sea port of Poti to the Kazakh Caspian port of Aktau – and from here to Afghanistan – via Baku and a 
sea route. Along the same route runs also an air corridor linking the US Incirlik base, in Anatolia, with Central 
Asia. The remaining NDN land routes connect Baltic ports to Afghanistan through the Kazakh territory. As per 
the relevance of NDN for US cooperation with Southern Caucasus and Central Asian partners, see A. Spruds, 
D. Potjomkina (eds.), Northern Distribution Network: Redefining Partnerships Within NATO and Beyond, Riga, 
Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2013. 
35 A. Bagbaslıoglu, “Beyond Afghanistan NATO’s partnership with Central Asia and South Caucasus: A tangled 
partnership?”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, no. 5, 2014, p. 89. 
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US Central Command and other US government agencies with a view to en-
hancing Caspian security.36  
Table10.3 - Annual funds budgeted for US annual security assistance* to 
Caspian littoral states (FY2002-2008, in millions dollars) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2002-2008 
Azerbaijan  14.82 10.79 18.47 33.14 33.02 33.56 47.41 191.21 
Kazakhstan 17.32 28.71 52.55 42.34 19.35 60.64 60.39 281.30 
Turkmenistan 5.93 0.96 2.70 6.58 1.75 5.27 5.37 28.56 
*Amounts refer to both Department of States and Department of Defense 
   Source: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eura-
sia, Country Assessments 
 
As a matter of fact, while bilateral cooperation with the two littoral 
states steadily improved during the Bush administrations, cooperation with 
Turkmenistan turned out to be more limited in scope and depth, mainly due to 
Ashgabat’s positive neutrality policy which restricted military exchanges with 
the US, and to isolationist policies that also had negative repercussions on en-
ergy cooperation – especially under Saparmurat Niyazov’s rule (1991-2006). 
Indeed, although the US was successful in overcoming the challenge of west-
ward transportation of Caspian resources from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 
this was not the case with Turkmenistan, whose involvement in the TCGP pro-
ject did not materialize.37 
Due to its strategic location in the heart of the Central Asian mass, and 
its positive attitude toward cooperation with the White House, Kazakhstan 
became one of the key partners in view of the US power projection toward Af-
ghanistan. Along with their cooperation under the NATO aegis, Washington 
and Astana developed bilateral security cooperation with a significant naval 
component. Although the topic of Caspian Sea militarization falls outside the 
scope of this article, it is worth noting that after 2003 the US contributed to 
the build-up and modernization of the Kazakh Caspian fleet and naval infra-
                                                            
36 S. Quigley, European Command transforming to accommodate new challenges, American Forces Press 
Service, 10 March 2006. 
37 Several were the factors which led to the failure of the TCGP project. Besides the fierce opposition of Mos-
cow and Teheran, based upon the lack of a comprehensive agreement among littoral states, two were the 
main causes. Firstly, the completion of Blue Stream gas pipeline between Russia and Turkey (2003) seemed 
to limit the market prospects of Turkmen gas. Secondly, the realization of the pipeline was hindered by the lack 
of multilatreal agreemnt over status of the Caspian which would provide legal basis for construction of such a 
pipeline  . 
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structure, as well as to the formulation of a national military naval doctrine.38 
A key component of US-Kazakh security cooperation was the attempt to pro-
vide Astana with ground, sea and air-force support capabilities to protect its 
Caspian offshore and coastal energy infrastructure.39 
Protection of offshore energy infrastructures has also represented a spe-
cial focus within US-Azerbaijani bilateral security cooperation in the Caspian 
basin. It is worth noting that besides responding to a counterterrorism logic, 
the maritime cooperation was simultaneously – though indirectly – functional 
to defuse the risk of interstate crisis linked to cross-claims on offshore depos-
its, in the absence of a collective agreement on border demarcation. This was 
particularly true in the case of Iran, whose claims on the Azerbaijani Alov field 
led to the July 2001 incident between an Iranian warship with air support and 
two BP prospecting vessels that were forced to cease operations.40 The linkage 
between maritime cooperation and the Iranian threat emerged mainly through 
the August 2003 Gas and Oil Platform (GOPLAT) joint maritime exercise, in-
volving the Araz-Alov-Sharg deposits area and strongly criticized by Teheran 
as an attempt by Washington to interfere in the Caspian legal status issue.41 
The relevance of the Central Asian chessboard for US strategic think-
ing, as well as the primacy of the security consideration, also had a relevant 
impact on the conception of energy security and energy cooperation. Indeed, 
with more emphasis than in the 1990s, the development of the Caspian energy 
potential came to be regarded as a strategic asset for stabilizing and averting 
state-failure in the Central Asian region, as well as limiting Russian leverage 
on European allies once again and isolating Iran from potential new markets 
and business opportunities. 
While the linkage between energy cooperation and Central Asian stabi-
lization would become a key feature under Barack Obama’s Presidency (cf. in-
fra), the trend toward securitization of energy policy had already emerged dur-
ing the Bush Administration. Against the backdrop of renewed tensions be-
tween Washington and Moscow, this trend became particularly evident in the 
wake of the so-called gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine (2006 and 2009) 
and, broadly speaking, as a result of Moscow’s ostensible tendency to resort to 
‘energy leverage’ in relations with both neighbors and buyers.42 Accordingly, 
the will to bolster a European gas supplies diversification policy was the main 
                                                            
38 US-Kazakh naval security cooperation was part of a wider agreement reached in September 2003 and 
aimed simultaneously at combating terrorism, developing peacekeeping forces, bolstering air defense capabili-
ties. The agreement was extended twice, in 2008 for a four-year period and in 2012 till 2017. 
39 R. McDermott, Kazakhstan’s Defense Policy: An Assessment of the Trends, Strategic Studies Institute, US 
Army War College, Carlisle, 2009, pp. 14-15. 
40 Eurasia Insight, 30 July 2001. 
41 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Azerbaijan Report, 25 August 2003 . 
42 In the aftermath of 2006 Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis, speaking in Vilnius US Vice President Dich Cheney re-
ferred to Moscow’s “supply manipulation or attempts to monopolise transportation” as “tools of intimidation or 
blackmail”. See S. Wagstyl, “Cheney rebukes Putin on energy blackmail”, Financial Times, 4 May 2006. 
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driver behind the support the US ensured for the EU Southern Corridor con-
cept, aimed at connecting the Caspian Sea with European gas markets – and in 
particular for the Nabucco pipeline, its most ambitious project in terms of 
both transport capacity and markets targeted. Besides the relevance of the 
Southern Corridor in defusing the risk connected to the EU’s over-dependence 
on Russian gas supplies, US support for the Nabucco project was fully in line 
with Washington's traditional regional energy policy goals. Indeed, the South-
ern Corridor ratio almost overlapped with the Clinton Administration’s East-
West Corridor concept – in terms of potential suppliers, transit routes and re-
gional development goals.43 Moreover, thanks in part to US pressure,44 the 
Southern Corridor project took over the principle of Iranian isolation from 
Caspian energy projects.  
However, the switching role of the US - which moved from being the 
main promoter of Caspian infrastructure projects to being the supporter of 
EU plans – manifested a relevant regional transition, with Washington taking 
a backseat in the international competition for westward transportation of 
Caspian gas, leaving Brussels as the main external Euro-Atlantic anchor for 
regional producer and transit states.  
10.3 Obama Administration’s Caspian policy: reinventing regional commitment  
Having left the EU with the “responsibility to lead” the implementation of 
pipeline projects on the Caspian-Anatolian axis, under the Obama Admin-
istration United States Caspian policy has been primarily linked to Afghan 
policy. The only exception to this trend has been the support the US provided 
to the upgrading of the Kazakh oil westward export network, in view of the 
production growth resulting from the second and third phases of the 
Kashagan field development which made the current CPC capacity inade-
quate. Against the backdrop of the difficult negotiations on the CPC’s expan-
sion, the US supported the development of the Kazakhstan Caspian Transpor-
tation System (KCTS), whose linchpin is the creation of a trans-Caspian naval 
connection system between the Kazakh port of Kuryk and Baku.  
Besides leaving the frontline of the Caspian energy competition, US in-
terests and policies regarding the basin’s resource development gradually de-
                                                            
43 In expressing the reasons for the support of the Southern Corridor, in 2012 a Congressional Minority Staff 
Report from perfectly highlighted the overlap between European energy policy and traditional US Goals, empa-
thizing that: “The next phase of the Southern Corridor would advance several US and NATO foreign policy ob-
jectives: it would further isolate Iran, assist in cultivating partners in the Caucasus and Central Asia and bolster 
their sovereign independence, and perhaps most importantly, curtail Russia’s energy leverage over European 
NATO allies”. Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe, Minority Staff Report Prepared for the Use of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 12 December 2012, Washington, US GPO, p. 2. 
44 See, e.g., the declaration of then-US Special Envoy for Caspian Energy, Richard Morningstar, in Reuters, 16 
July 2009. 
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tached themselves from those of Europe. Indeed, the center of gravity of the 
White House's Caspian policy gradually shifted eastward, moving from the 
South Caucasus-Anatolian to the Central-Southern Asian pole. Above all, 
such a shift was the result of the aforementioned attempt to stabilize the Cen-
tral Asia region in view of withdrawal of the ISAF force from Afghanistan – 
an ambitious goal wherein energy cooperation emerged as a key tool. Thus, 
the main feature of the Obama Administration’s policy toward the wider Cas-
pian area became its attempt to move from a security-first approach – which 
proved to be inconsistent and indeed counterproductive in both Afghan and 
Southern Caucasus scenarios – to an economic-oriented, trade-based ap-
proach.  
The watershed for the White House’s Caspian policy was the Novem-
ber 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, which fixed the 2014 deadline for the with-
drawal of forces from Afghanistan and forced the US Administration to set up 
an holistic policy aimed at preventing troop withdrawal from turning into re-
gional disengagement. Such a policy – labeled the “New Silk Road” initiative – 
was disclosed in July 2011 by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It revolved 
around the key goal of turning Afghanistan into a regional trade hub i.e. the 
core of “an international web and network of economic and transit connec-
tions” aimed at ensuring Central Asian stability through development and 
economic interdependence.45 
Against this background, US Caspian Sea policy turned out once more 
to be a key component of the White House’s Eurasian initiatives, from two 
perspectives. Firstly, from being conceived and exploited as a strategic sea and 
air route in support of coalition efforts in Afghanistan, the Obama Admin-
istration came to view the basin  as a potentially vital commercial route, epit-
omizing its transition from a security-first to an economically-oriented ap-
proach. Such a view was embodied by the new role envisioned for the NDN. 
Indeed, although the strategic value of the Network was far from reduced due 
to its relevance in view of the pullout of forces from Afghanistan, nonetheless 
it was gradually portrayed and promoted as a critical trade catalyst, enabling 
Central Asia to overcome its still poor regional integration with the world 
economy.46 Secondly, the development of Caspian producers’ energy potential 
and diversification of export routes – besides being consistent with the Admin-
istration’s overall aim of enhancing global energy security47 – emerged once 
                                                            
45 See H. Clinton, Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century, Anna Centenary Li-
brary, Chennai, India, 20 July 2011, available at www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/ 
07/168840.htm (last retrieved on 20 March 2014). 
46 See the US Assistant Secretary’s remarks at James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, 
in R. Blake, The Obama Administration’s Priorities in South and Central Asia, 19 January 2011, available at: 
www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2011/155002.htm (last retrieved 20 March 2014). 
47 As per the main priorities of Obama Administration Central Asian policy, see the statement by George Krol, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, in: “Reevaluating US Policy in 
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more as a key tool for achieving the economic security, sovereignty and pros-
perity of Central Asian partners. 
The centerpiece of Obama’s Caspian energy policy has been the re-
launch of the gas pipeline project connecting Turkmenistan to India through 
Afghanistan and Pakistan – whence the acronym TAPI – which, first proposed 
by Unocal in the mid 1990s, was frozen due to the strained relations between 
the US government and the Taliban regime in Kabul. As was the case for 
Azerbaijani infrastructures a decade earlier, the White House has supported 
the pipeline project firstly and foremost by engaging with and assisting in-
volved stakeholders, ranging from partner countries to US energy companies 
and IFIs. Under the current scheme and consistently with the agreements 
signed over the last five years, the 1700 km TAPI pipeline will run from the 
eastern Turkmenistan Dauletabad field to New Delhi through Herat and 
Quetta, with an annual capacity of 33 billion cubic meters of gas. Realization 
costs for TAPI – labeled by the Obama Administration as the ‘peace pipeline’ 
– are estimated at 7.6 billion dollars, to be partially provided by the Asian De-
velopment Bank. 
The US effort to promote the TAPI pipeline was facilitated by the 2006 
presidential succession in Turkmenistan. Indeed, Gurbanguly Berdimu-
hamedow’s rise to the presidency resulted in the overcoming of the excesses of 
the country’s isolationist tendencies and a renewed attempt to pursue an ex-
port diversification policy aimed at decreasing dependence on the Russian ex-
port network. In such a context, although Kazakhstan – considered to be the 
Central Asian “economic powerhouse” – remained a key regional interlocutor 
for the White House,48 after years of distrust in Washington-Ashgabat rela-
tions, Turkmenistan became de facto the lynchpin of the US Caspian and Cen-
tral Asian energy strategy. 
The eastward shift of US Caspian energy policy showed some continui-
ty with the former administrations’ strategies but, simultaneously, entailed a 
new set of tough challenges for the White House. As a matter of fact, the Iran 
isolation policy – along with the overall aim of making energy cooperation a 
key vector for regional development and cooperation – represents the main 
continuity factor linking Obama's Caspian strategy to those of the former ad-
ministrations. Indeed, against the backdrop of the worsening Iranian nuclear 
program crisis, one of the main aims of the TAPI project has been to prevent 
Southern Asian importing countries – namely Pakistan and India – from set-
                                                                                                                                                       
Central Asia”, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 15 December 2009, US GPO, Washington, pp. 9-13. 
48 Since 2010, as other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan was involved in the Annual Bilateral Consultations 
(ABC) with United States. The ABC format was replaced and elevated through the creation of a Strategic Part-
nership Commission, whose first meeting was held in April 2012 in Washington. Under the SPC framework, 
several working groups were created, including non-proliferation and disarmament, economic cooperation, and 
science and technology. 
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ting up a supply channel from Iran. Thus, as various declarations from US of-
ficers clearly show,49 TAPI represents an alternative to the Iran-Pakistan-India 
gas pipeline (IPI), a project set up in the mid 1990s and relaunched after 2009 
in order to simultaneously tackle the energy crisis which Islamabad faced after 
2008 and India’s growing need for gas imports. 
The discontinuity factors relate, on the other hand, to regional compet-
itors as well as the relationship with European partners. Indeed, while in the 
1990s the attempt to relaunch the Newly Independent States' energy sector saw 
Russia as the main regional hurdle and competitor, the current energy strategy 
has to deal with the steady rise of China as a key energy partner for the Caspi-
an eastern littoral states. Driven by the steady growth in energy consumption, 
since 2005 Beijing has reached out to Eastern Caspian producers with a reso-
lute oil and gas procurement strategy. This strategy has enabled China, in a 
very limited timeframe, to set up its first land import infrastructures between 
the Caspian area and Xinjiang – i.e. the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline origi-
nating in the port of Aktau, and the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline 
(CACGP), a 1,800 kilometer infrastructure with a capacity of 40 Bcm/y origi-
nating in eastern Turkmenistan. 
Although China’s Central Asian projection seems not to be entirely in 
contradiction with US regional objectives, it nevertheless poses a major chal-
lenge to the White House. The key element ensuring complementarity for US 
and Chinese Caspian energy strategies is the diversification of regional pro-
ducers’ export channels which, traditionally pursued by the White House, was 
ensured by the realization of the Beijing-promoted oil and gas pipeline con-
necting Central Asia to Xinjiang. Moreover, as long as Beijing and Teheran do 
not put forward joint infrastructural projects, Chinese pressure on Caspian 
producers would seem to play into the US hand by downgrading the attrac-
tiveness of alternative export routes toward Iran and the Persian Gulf. 
That said, it is difficult to overestimate the challenging nature of Bei-
jing’s Caspian strategy for the US, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 
Under the former perspective, Chinese pressure on Eastern Caspian producer 
states, by addressing the same counterparts involved in US projects, reduces 
the feasibility of the pipelines supported by the White House. This is particu-
larly evident in the case of Chinese gas imports from Turkmenistan through 
the CACGP, which apparently could absorb the bulk of the Turkmen gas pro-
duction increase and, consequently, the resources necessary for the realization 
of TAPI – all the more so after the recent agreements to upgrade the import 
network and increase the import flow from 40 to 65 Bcm/y by 2020.50   
                                                            
49 See, for instance, declaration by US Ambassador to Pakistan, R. Olson, “US supports TAPI but not Pak-Iran 
gas pipeline”, The Nation, 5 March 2013. 
50 CACI Analyst, Field Report, 16 October 2013. 
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The Chinese challenge is no less significant in qualitative terms i.e. in 
relation to Beijing’s way of doing business in the Caspian. The typical conver-
gence of interests and policies of Chinese governmental, banking sector and 
energy institutions provides the target countries with a business model which 
has no parallel in the USA or other Western countries. Such a model – embod-
ied by the so-called oil-for-loans policy51 – provides Beijing with a competitive 
advantage which bore its fruits in the race for Caspian energy resources, all the 
more so due to the grip on the national energy sector held by local executive 
powers. Moreover, the Chinese “no strings attached” policy – which postulates 
doing business without interfering in political issues – gives Beijing a flexibility 
and degree of adaptability to local conditions hardly achievable by the United 
States, for which the promotion of democratization represents a key regional 
policy priority.  
Along with the impressive results achieved in Kazakhstan – where 
China’s share of the current oil production has reached 24%52 – the Turkmen 
case best embodies Beijing’s competitive advantage over the US. In Turkmeni-
stan, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has managed to 
overcome the typical defense posture of the authorities, becoming the first for-
eign company to hold exclusive rights over significant onshore gas fields – typ-
ically granted only for offshore field development. This consideration is all the 
more relevant as the enduring failure of US companies – namely Chevron and 
ExxonMobil – to acquire analogous rights in Turkmenistan, notwithstanding 
the White House’s firm support for them, is currently one of the main imped-
iments to the realization of the TAPI project. 
The gradual decoupling of US and EU Caspian strategies is the second 
key factor of discontinuity between Obama’s and his predecessors’ regional 
energy strategies. Indeed, although the White House supports the EU attempt 
to feed the Southern Corridor with Turkmen gas, nevertheless the priority giv-
en to the implementation of TAPI makes the United States a competitor ra-
ther than a supporter of European plans – as demonstrated by the Turkmen 
authorities’ supposed prioritization of TAPI over TCGP.53 Indeed, in a situa-
tion in which it is hardly questionable whether Turkmenistan would have suf-
ficient gas resources to feed the TAPI project, intra-Atlantic infrastructural 
competition weakens EU plans to set up a trans-Caspian gas pipeline, resulting 
                                                            
51 The oil-for-loan policy revolves around the the concession of loans in exchange for future oil supplies to gov-
ernments in search of financial assistance – a model which took advantage of the global economic crisis fol-
lowing 2008. By doing so, Beijing ensured future supply, while simultaneously finding inroads into previously 
closed markets, deepening trade partnerships and providing fresh opportunities to national companies, both 
within and outside the energy sector. See A.C. Alves, “Chinese Economic Statecraft: A Comparative Study of 
China’s Oil-backed Loans in Angola and Brazil”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol. 42 no. 1, 2013, pp. 99-
130.  
52 Xinhua, 27 September 2013. 
53 N. Moore, “Turkmenistan Weekly News Analysis”, Eurasianet, 22 November 2012. 
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in a dangerous hiatus that threatens to undermine the interests and policies of 
the broader Western front. 
Conclusions: the Caspian Basin in US strategic thinking 
As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, although US Caspian policy 
has been largely derivative over the last twenty years, nonetheless the magni-
tude of interests at stake in the wider Caspian area – plus the key role the basin 
plays in the context of all major issues in the Eurasian post-bipolar system – 
have placed the Sea high on the White House’s foreign policy agenda. This 
largely derived from the basin's two main geopolitical assets i.e. its critical geo-
graphic collocation in the heart of the Eurasian system and the significant 
presence of largely-unexploited hydrocarbon reserves, whose has development 
turned into a key tool for littoral and regional actors’ policies. From this per-
spective, it may be affirmed that Caspian policy was simultaneously a key vec-
tor and a test-case for the post-Cold War process of redefinition of the inter-
ests and strategies of the main regional and international players active in the 
Eurasian space – and not least so for the United States and its key Atlantic al-
lies. 
The Clinton Administration deserves credit for having set the priorities 
and key tools of Caspian policy along key guidelines which are still valid to-
day. Indeed, the overall aims of supporting the then-Newly Independent Cas-
pian State’ independence, sovereignty and development, and creating business 
opportunities for US companies while simultaneously limiting Russian region-
al influence and preventing the spread of Iranian influence, may be considered 
the main common features linking the three presidencies under scrutiny - three 
presidencies whose mandates roughly overlap the same number of stages of 
US Caspian policy. 
Though working as an accelerator rather than a watershed for US Cas-
pian policies, 9/11 and its resulting regional developments had a double impact 
by changing the regional objectives from which the policies derived. In the 
short-term, 9/11 presided over the prioritization of security cooperation versus 
energy cooperation, consistently with the needs of the Enduring Freedom Af-
ghan operations. Hence, while in the 1990s requests for security cooperation 
and guarantees were primarily made by the Caspian actors and addressed to 
their Euro-Atlantic state and super-national interlocutors, in the following 
decade this trend was reversed and the White House regional interlocutors 
came to be viewed as security providers rather than security consumers. More-
over, the priorities reversal was facilitated by the simultaneous conclusion of 
the first phase of Caspian energy policy i.e. by the realization of the BTC and 
SCP pipelines which, by breaking the Russian monopsony over the basin’s re-
sources, still stand as the main accomplishment of US Caspian policies. 
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Over the medium-term, the effects of post 9/11 regional developments 
on Caspian policy resulted primarily in the prioritization of the eastern dimen-
sion at the expense of the western one, consistently with the White House’s 
need to put forward a regional stabilization strategy in view of the withdrawal 
of forces from Afghanistan. Significantly, this trend appears to have presided 
over a fragmentation of the wider Caspian area in US strategic thinking, with 
the Southern Caucasus and Central Asian regions gradually becoming de-
tached from one another and the Caspian Sea being dragged into the latter, ra-
ther than into the wider Black Sea region. Still in fieri, such a strategy sees the 
Obama Administration walking a difficult tightrope, which is all the more 
slippery due to the enduring instability of the Central Asian scenario and 
whose inherent contradictions seem to further undermine the “Atlantic Tick-
et”. An Atlantic Ticket which, already regionally weakened by the burden-
sharing issues arisen in Afghanistan, seems instead to be crucial for allowing 
the US – as well as the EU – to counteract old and new pressures exerted on its 
Caspian partners by Russia and China.  
 
